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objective. Ebola virus disease (EVD) places healthcare personnel (HCP) at high risk for infection during patient care, and personal
protective equipment (PPE) is critical. Protocols for EVD PPE doffing have not been validated for prevention of viral self-contamination. Using
surrogate viruses (non-enveloped MS2 and enveloped Φ6), we assessed self-contamination of skin and clothes when trained HCP doffed EVD
PPE using a standardized protocol.
methods. A total of 15 HCP donned EVD PPE for this study. Virus was applied to PPE, and a trained monitor guided them through the
doffing protocol. Of the 15 participants, 10 used alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) for glove and hand hygiene and 5 used hypochlorite for glove
hygiene and ABHR for hand hygiene. Inner gloves, hands, face, and scrubs were sampled after doffing.
results. After doffing, MS2 virus was detected on the inner glove worn on the dominant hand for 8 of 15 participants, on the non-dominant
inner glove for 6 of 15 participants, and on scrubs for 2 of 15 participants. All MS2 on inner gloves was observed when ABHR was used for glove
hygiene; none was observed when hypochlorite was used. When using hypochlorite for glove hygiene, 1 participant had MS2 on hands, and
1 had MS2 on scrubs.
conclusions. A structured doffing protocol using a trained monitor and ABHR protects against enveloped virus self-contamination.
Non-enveloped virus (MS2) contamination was detected on inner gloves, possibly due to higher resistance to ABHR. Doffing protocols
protective against all viruses need to incorporate highly effective glove and hand hygiene agents.
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In the absence of highly effective vaccines and treatment
options, personal protective equipment (PPE) is critical for
protecting HCPs from EVD during patient care.1 The 2014–
2015 outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa
resulted in >28,000 cases and >11,000 deaths.2 Healthcare
personnel (HCP) were at high risk for acquiring EVD during
patient care, with 800 cases occurring among HCP as of March
2015.3 EVD spreads through contact with bodily fluids that are
produced in high volumes during the acute phase of disease.4,5
Therefore, effective protection requires more PPE and differ-
ent items of PPE than HCP ordinarily wear in the care of
patients on contact, droplet, or airborne isolation precautions.
PPE recommendations for care of EVD have been for-
mulated by the World Health Organization and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.6,7 These recommendations
for EVD PPE include full wearing of full body, fluid-resistant
suits and gowns, footwear, N95 respirators or Powered air
purifying respirators (PAPRs), and face shields. The goal of
this PPE is to leave no skin or mucous membranes exposed to
virus.6 Achievement of this goal requires the use of complex
PPE donning and doffing protocols that are difficult to
implement. Previous research has shown that full compliance
with recommended PPE doffing methods and sequences is
highly variable among staff who use standard contact isolation
PPE,8,9 and numerous studies have shown that HCP are at
risk for self-contamination during the process of doffing
contaminated PPE.10–13 This risk is likely to be even higher
during the complex doffing of EVD PPE. Full adherence to the
proper methods and sequence of PPE removal is particularly
important when contaminated PPE is removed by personnel
caring for patients with EVD.14
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
formulated protocols for the doffing of EVD PPE after patient
care to reduce the risk of viral transmission to HCP during
doffing.6 Doffing protocols specify a sequence for PPE doffing
and hand hygiene at critical points during doffing. A key
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component of these protocols is interaction with a trained PPE
monitor during the doffing process. The HCP doffing PPE is
verbally guided through the sequence by another HCP who has
the doffing protocol in front of them in the form of a checklist.
The monitor visually assesses the integrity of the PPE, provides
verbal instruction at each step, and ensures that the doffing
process is performed correctly, including sequence of PPE
items, handling of contaminated PPE items, and hand hygiene.
Ideally, the presence of a trained monitor reduces the risk of
errors in the doffing process that might lead to self-
contamination. However, this protocol has not been empiri-
cally validated to determine whether self-contamination
occurs during the doffing process if PPE is contaminated
with viruses.
Self-contamination during PPE is difficult to assess under
real conditions in healthcare settings, but it can be done
under controlled conditions with surrogate viruses. We have
previously used controlled laboratory simulation approaches
with human volunteers, incorporating bacteriophages
as surrogates for human viruses to assess the risk of
self-contamination during PPE doffing under controlled
observation conditions.11,15 The goal of this research was to
assess viral self-contamination of skin and clothes during a
standard EVD PPE doffing protocol performed by trained
HCPs using PPE artificially contaminated with 2 surrogate
viruses: MS2 (a surrogate for non-enveloped human viruses)
and bacteriophage Φ6 (a surrogate for enveloped viruses such
as Ebola).
methods
All protocols were approved by the UNC Biomedical Institu-
tional Review Board. Study participants were all members of
the Ebola care team at a large tertiary care academic medical
center. Members of the Ebola team were >18 years of age and
had undergone extensive training in a simulation laboratory in
the use of EVD-specific PPE, including donning and doffing.
HCP were excluded as team members if they were pregnant,
immunocompromised, trainees, allergic to latex, or had non-
intact skin on their hands or face.
The trained PPE monitor was a registered nurse and certi-
fied infection preventionist who underwent training at the
CDC to (1) serve as a PPEmonitor, and (2) train others to don,
wear, and doff EVD-specific PPE. This infection preventionist
served as the trained monitor for all simulations. The doffing
protocol used in simulations is shown in Table 1. Simulations
took place in a patient room. The participant removed their
own clothes and donned a scrub shirt and pants. The PPE
monitor then verbally guided them through the donning
process using the checklist. When finished, each participant
was wearing a Tyvek suit with thumb holes to prevent sliding
up the wrist, long-sleeved fluid-resistant gown with thumb
holes to prevent sliding up the wrist, 2 pairs of long gloves
(covering the wrist completely), Tyvek hood, face shield, N95
respirator, and fluid-resistant boots. After donning PPE, a
mixture of MS2 and Φ6 suspended in phosphate-buffered
saline was applied to 4 sites: (1) the palm of the dominant
hand, (2) the shoulder of the gown opposite the dominant
hand, (3) the top side of the face shield on the same side as the
dominant hand, and (4) the toe of the rubber boot opposite
the dominant hand. Contamination sites were chosen in
consultation with clinicians who had participated in EVD
patient care and had directly observed PPE contamination
during patient care. A total of 25 µL was applied to each site in
5 drops of 5 µL each to simulate droplet exposure, particularly
small droplet exposure of which the HCP may not be aware.
The mean virus titer applied to each site in 25 µL was 1 × 108
for MS2 and 5 × 107 for Φ6, based on reports of viral load in
body fluids during acute phases of EVD.4,16,17 The participants
were instructed to close their eyes during application so they
did not see the exact location of contamination.
To simulate natural movement while wearing PPE, the HCP
then performed a gown change on a mannequin. After the
gown change, the PPE doffing process began. The trained
monitor guided the HCP participants through the doffing
process using the checklist in Table 1. For the first 10 subjects,
each step that called for sanitizing gloved hands, as well as the
final hand hygiene steps (steps 13 and 16) that called for
sanitizing bare hands, were performed using alcohol-based
hand rub (ABHR) as a 70% ethanol gel (Purell, Gojo Indus-
tries, Akron, OH). For the last 5 subjects, each step that called
for sanitizing gloved hands was performed with liquid hypo-
chlorite at a concentration of 1,850 ppm (Fuzion Healthcare
Disinfectant, Clorox Co., Pleasanton, CA) applied by spraying
onto gloves. The final hand hygiene steps (Steps 13 and 16)
that called for sanitizing bare hands were performed
using ABHR.
At the doffing step when inner gloves were removed
(Step 12), they were collected for sampling. After the doffing
process, 3 sites were sampled for virus: bare hands, face, and
scrubs worn under PPE. After performance of the final hand
hygiene step using ABHR (step #16), hands were sampled
for virus using whole-hand sampling.18 The face was swabbed
for virus. After doffing was complete, scrubs were collected for
sampling. Samples were immediately transported back to the
laboratory for analysis using previously described methods.19
All samples were assayed for MS2 and Φ6 using the single agar
layer (SAL) assay on the appropriate bacterial host. Virus
recovered from each site was expressed as plaque-forming
units (PFUs).
results
A total of 15 HCP participated: 11 registered nurses and 4
medical doctors. There was no detectable transfer of enveloped
bacteriophage Φ6 to inner gloves, hands, face, or scrubs for
any participants. There was detectable transfer of non-
enveloped bacteriophage MS2 (Table 2). MS2 was detected
on both hands of 1 participant (there was no MS2 detected on
the inner gloves for this participant). The amount of MS2
detected on the hands was low (<0.00005% of the original
inoculum).
MS2 was detected on the inner glove worn on the dominant
hand for 8 of 15 participants, on the non-dominant inner
glove for 6 of 15 participants, and on scrubs for 2 of 15
participants. There was no detectable transfer of MS2 to the
face. Importantly, 1 participant, who had detectable transfer to
scrubs stated that during the doffing procedure, believed that
when the Tyvek hood, N95 respirator, and face shield were
removed simultaneously, the hood/respirator/face shield
combination had made contact with the front of their
scrub shirt.
All detectable transfer of MS2 to inner gloves was
observed when ABHR was used for the glove sanitizing steps;
no transfer was observed when hypochlorite was used for
the glove-sanitizing steps. However, 1 participant using
hypochlorite for glove sanitizing had virus transfer to hands,
and 1 participant using hypochlorite for glove sanitizing had
transfer to scrubs.
discussion
The recent epidemic of Ebola in West Africa was by far the
largest Ebola outbreak described to date. For HCP practicing
in non-outbreak countries, the 2 greatest risk factors for
acquisition of EVD were (1) contact with an infected patient
due to failure to screen for travel to or from West Africa and
(2) exposure to a person with EVD and self-contamination
during the doffing procedure. The importance of preventing
acquisition of EVD during patient care cannot be overstated;
>800 HCP developed EVD during this outbreak.
Our study is the first to validate the use of the CDC recom-
mended EVD PPE with this type of complex PPE doffing
protocol under controlled conditions by observing the fate of
both enveloped and non-enveloped viruses on PPE during
doffing. Previous research has shown that self-contamination of
hands with a non-enveloped virus during doffing is common in
routine use of standard contact isolation PPE,10 and carefully
structured, monitored doffing is especially important during
table 1. PPE Doffing Protocol
Step Required Action
1 Wash gloved hands with water and chlorhexidine (CHG).
2 Step into chlorine bath.
∙ 1 minute contact time
∙ Step off to absorbent pad.
3 Perform PPE integrity check in designated doffing area.
4 Remove first set of gloves.
∙ Check integrity of inner glove.
5 Clean gloved hands with alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR).
6 Remove impervious blue gown.
∙ Grab impervious blue gown at the shoulder and pull forward to remove.
7 Clean gloved hands with ABHR.
8 Remove Tyvek Suit.
∙ Healthcare personnel (HCP) should locate naval and follow along zipper line until they locates “pull tie” on the suit.
∙ Unzip fully.
∙ Grab the suit on the shoulders, or bend forward and grab chest area of the suit, and pull it off shoulders.
∙ Take caution to minimize touching the outside of the suit.
∙ Push the suit down past the top of the boots touching only the inside of the suit and not the boots.
∙ Stand up and step out of the suit; without letting the suit touch your scrubs, pick it up, touching only a place on the inside
where you did not step and place in the waste container.
9 Clean gloved hands with ABHR.
10 Remove hood, mask and face shield.
∙ During the following step, please keep eyes and mouth closed.
∙ After removal immediately join hands together and do not touch your skin, face or clothing.
∙ Reach gloved hands to either side of the back of the Tyvek hood.
∙ Gripping both elastic ties and hood, bend forward and gently pull until Tyvek hood, N95, face shield, and bouffant cap
(if worn) are off.
11 Clean gloved hands with ABHR.
12 Remove inner gloves using aseptic technique.
13 Clean hands with ABHR.
14 Step into chlorine bath.
∙ 1 minute contact time
∙ Step off to absorbent pad.
15 Remove boots
∙ Boots should remain in the Hot Zone.
16 Clean hands with ABHR.
EVD patient care.14 Using a structured doffing protocol under
the direction of a trained monitor, there was no transfer of an
enveloped surrogate for Ebola virus to hands, face, or clothing.
The enveloped surrogate virus was also not detected on inner
gloves for any participants. These results suggest that current
doffing protocols, including the use of ABHR, are protective
against self-contamination with an enveloped virus.
In 2 previous studies, complex PPE doffing was investigated;
both used fluorescent tracers as markers of contamination.
Zamora et al13 evaluated complex PPE doffing but found more
frequent contamination of hands with fluorescent tracer than was
found with viruses in this study. Bell et al20 found contamination
with fluorescent tracer after PPE removal; in their study, con-
tamination of PPE was carried out during simulated patient care,
and contamination could potentially have come from patient care
or PPE doffing. The body of literature evaluating simulated PPE
removal using both fluorescent markers and infectious viruses
simultaneously is small.10,11 While a single study found that rates
of self-contamination with fluorescent tracer and MS2 were
similar,10 there is no published evidence using enveloped viruses,
and it is not yet clear whether fluorescent tracers are sensitive and
specific markers of self-contamination with infectious viruses.
Our study is the first to isolate contamination taking place during
the doffing process itself from contamination taking place during
patient care and to use infectious viruses as markers of potential
transmission.
In this study, we detected transfer of non-enveloped MS2 to
the clothing of 2 participants and the hands of 1 participant.
MS2 was also detectable on the inner gloves of some participants
when ABHR was used to sanitize gloves between doffing steps.
In these simulations, hands were sampled after a final hand
hygiene step using ABHR. In the doffing protocol, this hand
hygiene step using ABHR is the final step before exiting the
doffing area to remove scrubs and shower (Table 1). The risk of
hand contamination may be further reduced by incorporating a
final step of hand hygiene using water and an antimicrobial soap
such as chlorhexidine. The fact that participants had detectable
MS2 on their inner gloves but not on their hands suggests that
inner gloves are playing a vital role as the point of contact with
PPE. Because gloves are continually touching new areas on PPE
as the doffing process progresses, even repeated use of a hand
sanitizer on the outside of the gloves may not completely pre-
vent residual inner glove contamination with a non-enveloped
virus. The presence of a low level of MS2 contamination on the
hands of 1 participant who did not have detectable MS2 on their
inner gloves suggests that random low-level contamination
events are still possible. This highlights the importance of rein-
forcing the message that even when wearing multiple layers of
PPE that provide whole-body coverage, hand hygiene after
doffing is still critical, as is the careful selection of effective hand
hygiene agents for this purpose. In addition, it is reasonable to
recommend that HCP involved in care of patients with EVD
post-doffing shower using an antiseptic such as chlorhexidine.
There may be differences in the way that lipid-enveloped and
non-enveloped viruses survive during PPE doffing. Virus transfers
to hands and scrubs were observed only for a non-enveloped
surrogate in these simulations. The choice of hand sanitizer agent
used on hands and gloves may be important depending on the
type of virus of concern. EnvelopedΦ6 was not detected on inner
gloves when ABHR was used, but MS2 was detected. This result is
consistent with previous findings that ABHR is more effective
against enveloped than non-enveloped viruses.21–24 Careful
doffing of inner gloves in a manner that minimizes the risk of
hand contamination is important. To minimize viral contamina-
tion of inner gloves, more conservative control measures may
include sanitizing gloves with stronger agents such as hypo-
chlorite. While hypochlorite use directly on hands may not be
desirable, its use on gloves does not present the same issues.
table 2. Detection of Non-enveloped Bacteriophage MS2 After PPE Doffing
Hands Inner Gloves
Subject Non-dominant Dominant Non-dominant Dominant Face Shirt Glove Sanitizer
1 ND ND ND 1·1 × 103 ND ND ABHR
2 ND ND ND ND ND ND ABHR
3 ND ND 1·7 × 103 2·9 × 102 ND ND ABHR
4 ND ND ND 2·6 × 102 ND ND ABHR
5 ND ND 9·2 × 104 5·5 × 104 ND ND ABHR
6 ND ND ND ND ND ND ABHR
7 ND ND 8·5 × 101 1·2 × 103 ND 3·16× 104 ABHR
8 ND ND 2·8 × 104 3·6 × 104 ND ND ABHR
9 ND ND 7·6 × 103 3·0 × 104 ND ND ABHR
10 ND ND 5·2 × 102 1·8 × 103 ND ND ABHR
11 ND ND ND ND ND ND HOCl
12 ND ND ND ND ND ND HOCl
13 ND ND ND ND ND ND HOCl
14 6·4 × 101 1·0 × 102 ND ND ND ND HOCl
15 ND ND ND ND ND 6·16× 103 HOCl
NOTE. ND, not detected; ABHR, alcohol-based hand rub; HOCl, hypochlorite glove sanitizer.
The fact that 1 participant recognized unintentional contact
of PPE with the front of their scrub shirt underscores the need
for both independent monitoring and participant self-
monitoring during the complex doffing process. In these
simulations, the trained monitor did not observe any devia-
tions from the doffing protocol by the participants, but there
may be contact and contamination events that are not readily
visible even to a trained monitor. In this and other doffing
protocols, scrubs are touched with bare hands and may be
removed and handled after exiting the patient care area. The
detection of virus on scrubs suggests a need for careful hand-
ling of scrubs after doffing, as well as development of guide-
lines for handling scrubs if contamination is recognized during
the doffing process.
A structured doffing protocol using a trained monitor,
double gloves, and multiple glove sanitizing steps appears to
protect against self-contamination with enveloped viruses. There
was a low risk of self-contamination with a non-enveloped virus,
possibly due to their higher resistance to agents used to sanitize
gloves. Future research can adapt this methodology for evaluating
of a variety of doffing protocols, which can vary from facility
to facility. Future studies should also incorporate different
levels and quantities of contamination on the surface of PPE.
If non-enveloped viruses are of concern in the future, improved
doffing protocols that are highly protective against all types of
viruses may need to incorporate highly effective glove sanitizing
and hand hygiene agents.
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